协议 · CELAR 文档
门限密钥管理:永不存在的密钥
如果状态是加密的,那么显而易见的问题就是: 谁持有密钥? Celar(瑟拉) 的回答是: 没有任何单一席位,也没有任何低于门限的参与方。TFHE 解密密钥仅以份额形式分散存在于委员会中,由一场分布式仪式生成。门限解密从不重建该密钥;而超过门限的联盟(13 个及以上席位)则可以,该限度在下文说明。
运作方式
- 分布式密钥生成。 一次可公开验证的仪式产出密钥份额,并公开全部记录;行为不当的参与方会在创世之前被剔除。
- 门限解密。 Any decryption or re-encryption requires a threshold quorum of seats to cooperate. Partial decryptions are designed to be attributable to the seat that produced them, so unauthorized service can be proven and penalised; that penalty is not yet built. The committee configuration is 50 个席位,门限 12 — run and verified end-to-end in a test ceremony, and not yet securing value. Up to 12 seats learn nothing; 13 colluding seats could reconstruct the key, and we publish that rather than hide it. Thirteen seats are not thirteen independent parties: under today's admission rules, as few as two network operators, cloud providers or client implementations could together hold thirteen seats — whitepaper §7.1 publishes that figure too. Larger committees are not reachable on this engine, and no work is scoped to reach them. Whitepaper §7.1 states the configuration and its limits.
- 主动刷新。 Proactive refresh is implemented and validated: the committee re-randomizes every share without changing the key. Attested erasure of superseded shares is implemented as well; once operators are bound to it, refresh will also limit how long an attacker has to assemble a quorum. Seat rotation on staggered terms is designed but deferred.
- 带噪声淹没的解密。 Authorized partial decryptions carry calibrated noise so repeated decryptions stay safe even against adversarially crafted ciphertexts. That safety assumes a per-key-epoch decryption budget. Today each seat counts its own decryptions, so a coalition at the threshold could exceed the budget; making the count fleet-wide is specified and not yet built — the figure is stated in §7.2 of the technical whitepaper, whose public edition is in the data room.
一个你可以自行核验的安全数字
多数链只说“去中心化”。Celar 给出一个上界,并公开其全部输入。攻陷一个解密法定人数需要多少质押、在 10 年滚动窗口内的可能性有多大,均以曲线形式载于 health dashboard 以及白皮书 §7.7 —— 它是一条曲线而非单一数字,而在当前委员会规模下,足够庞大的攻击者会攻陷所有配置。在此之上还有实时健康规则 ℋ ≥ 2:发动攻击的成本必须始终至少是其可能窃取价值的两倍。
如实说明的局限: FHE 层的隐私以这个委员会为前提(达到或超过解密所需人数的联盟能够解密);而 ZK 屏蔽池 is deliberately independent of it. Disaster recovery is designed to be public-by-construction — timelocked, transcript-published, resharing-only. The design has no covert decryption path.